The Moral Animal: Why We Are The Way We Are

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Range, Friederike, Lisa Horn, Zsófia Viranyi, and Ludwig Huber. 2008. The Absence of Reward Induces Inequity Aversion in Dogs. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences December.

Rutgers, Bart, and Robert Heeger. 1999. Inherent Worth and Respect for Animal Integrity. In Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of Animals: Beyond Animal Welfare, ed. Marcel Dol et al. Assen: Van Gorcum.his victims do from living? Should we publicly execute a framed innocent man if it would deter a thousand murderers? Our intuitions shout "no," suggesting that inherent moral principles like individual rights are not so easy serial divorce, the old families are abandoned. Mr. Wright challenges us to think through the implications: Schmelz, Martin, Sebastian Grueneisen, Alihan Kabalak, Jürgen Jost, and Michael Tomasello. 2017. Chimpanzees Return Favors at a Personal Cost. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114(28): 7462–7467. Johnny Carson, like many wealthy, high-status males, spent his career monopolizing long stretches of the reproductive years of a series of young women. Somewhere out there is a man who wanted a family and a beautiful wife and, if it hadn't

Reimert, Inonge, J. Elizabeth Bolhuis, Bas Kemp, and T. Bas Rodenburg. 2013. Indicators of Positive and Negative Emotions and Emotional Contagion in Pigs. Physiology & Behavior 109: 42–50. Knapska, Ewelina, Evgeni Nikolaev, Pawel Boguszewski, Grazyna Walasek, Janusz Blaszczyk, Leszek Kaczmarek, and Tomasz Werka. 2006. Between-Subject Transfer of Emotional Information Evokes Specific Pattern of Amygdala Activation. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 103(10): 3858–3862. Once a courtship is consummated, men and women have a common interest in their offspring. But love is not always infinite and everlasting. Infidelity is a siren, always giving males an opportunity to multiply their progeny and sometimes giving females Parr, Lisa A. 2001. Cognitive and Physiological Markers of Emotional Awareness in Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes). Animal Cognition 4(3–4): 223–229.Likewise, in the case of animals, these coping mechanisms may develop and disguise the extent to which animals are harmed in a specific situation, which is one of the reasons why their suffering can be an unreliable measure of their well-being. If Sustitia 2 eventually became habituated to the suffering of her conspecifics and no longer felt distressed when she perceived it, a welfarist would have to conclude that she is no longer being harmed. In fact, from a welfarist perspective, we would have to say that Sustitia 2 has been benefitted due to this habituation process, insofar as it has led her to stop suffering. The capabilities approach, in contrast, allows for certain forms of suffering to be valuable in themselves, an idea that Nussbaum expresses by saying that “some animal pains may even be valuable: the grief of an animal for a dead child or parent […] may be a constituent part of an attachment that is intrinsically good” (Nussbaum 2007, 345; emphasis by authors). One might object to Nussbaum’s claim by arguing that an attachment can exist without grief, so grief is a manifestation of an attachment, not a constituent part of it. However, while it’s true that an attachment can occur without grief, it’s also true that if there is an attachment and certain conditions are met, the attachment yields grief. If it does not, then arguably there is no real attachment. Under certain conditions, grief is the right thing to feel. It’s a sign of the quality of an attachment. Whether or not this means that grief is a constituent part of the attachment seems largely a matter of stipulation, but it does seem right to say that if you value the attachment, then you have to value the grief that comes with it. The first consideration that we can offer is that it doesn’t seem enough to simply say that Sustitia 2 is suffering. In the case of Sustitia 1, it did seem enough because we didn’t describe her as having any particular ability, over and above the ability to experience enjoyment and suffering (and to eat, sleep, and reproduce). What was wrong about the use of the farrowing crate in the case of Sustitia 1 was not that it prevented her from building a nest for her piglets, or from comforting them if they felt distressed, because we didn’t give her these abilities in the first place. All we did was give her the ability to find it painful and stressful, which is why it’s enough to say that the farrowing crate harms her because it makes her suffer. In the case of Sustitia 2, this treatment is also doing something else, namely, preventing her from exercising her moral capability. So simply saying that it makes her suffer isn’t enough. Bartal, Ben-Ami, Jean Decety Inbal, and Peggy Mason. 2011. Empathy and Pro-Social Behavior in Rats. Science 334 (6061): 1427–1430.

Tulogdi, Áron, Máté Tóth, Beáta Barsvári, László Biró, Éva Mikics, and József Haller. 2014. Effects of Resocialization on Post-Weaning Social Isolation-Induced Abnormal Aggression and Social Deficits in Rats. Developmental Psychobiology 56(1): 49–57. Broom, Donald M. 1991. Animal Welfare: Concepts and Measurement. Journal of Animal Science 69(10): 4167–4175. According to the capabilities approach, then, one is harmed when the agency of another results in a thwarting or blighting of one’s basic capabilities. When a being is very complex, this doesn’t necessarily mean that she will have the capacity to suffer more, but it does mean that she will be capable of suffering more types of harm than less complex beings, given that a higher complexity means a possession of more basic capabilities that can be thwarted. And, as we shall shortly discuss, the harm that comes from the thwarting of a being’s basic capabilities doesn’t necessarily have to take the experiential form of pain or suffering. Footnote 16 Moral Emotions as Capabilities Reimert, Inonge, J. Elizabeth Bolhuis, Bas Kemp, and T. Bas Rodenburg. 2015. Emotions on the Loose: Emotional Contagion and the Role of Oxytocin in Pigs. Animal Cognition 18(2): 517–532. THE mind is a product of the brain, and the brain is a product of evolution's organizing force, natural selection. This simple Darwinian truth has illuminated vast stretches of our mental life. Why do we see in depth and enjoy sweets? Not becauseIn addition to reciprocal altruism, fairness, justice, empathy, and kin selection, other moral instincts that have evolved through natural selection include cooperation, trust, and the aversion to harming others. These instincts contribute to the survival and reproductive success of individuals and social groups by fostering cooperation, resolving conflicts, and maintaining stable social structures.

In this section, we offer four considerations that support the claim that the harm affecting Sustitia 2 cannot be fully captured in terms of experiential welfare. Because we have not given a defence of the capabilities approach, what we will put forward cannot be considered a conclusive argument. However, its strength doesn’t solely depend on the strength of the capabilities approach, since, as we mentioned before, other theories could also be successfully employed here. The considerations we will offer are reasons that support the need to move beyond welfarism when analysing cases like Sustitia 2’s. While they ultimately rely on intuitions, we hope to show that these reasons are powerful enough to cast serious doubts on the ability of welfarism to rise up to the challenge. Sustitia 2 is Being Doubly Harmed Bartal, Ben-Ami, Haozhe Shan Inbal, Nora M.R. Molasky, Teresa M. Murray, Jasper Z. Williams, Jean Decety, and Peggy Mason. 2016. Anxiolytic Treatment Impairs Helping Behavior in Rats. Frontiers in Psychology. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00850. Furthermore, Wright argues that our capacity for moral reasoning and ethical behavior is also shaped by evolutionary forces. Our moral judgments and behaviors are influenced by a combination of genetic predispositions and cultural influences. However, at the core of our moral principles lie fundamental evolutionary drives, such as the desire to promote the survival and well-being of ourselves and our kin. Ikkatai, Yuko, Shigeru Watanabe, and Ei-Ichi Izawa. 2016. Reconciliation and Third-Party Affiliation in Pair-Bond Budgerigars ( Melopsittacus Undulatus). Behaviour 153(9–11): 1173–1193.

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that absorbs a culture's mores (bad ones now, better ones in a reformed society), resisted the idea of an inherited complex human nature. And the forces of what would now be called political correctness accused sociobiologists Ferrari, Arianna. 2012. Animal Disenhancement for Animal Welfare: The Apparent Philosophical Conundrums and the Real Exploitation of Animals. A Response to Thompson and Palmer. Nanoethics 6: 65–76. men attracting several wives. Though women in these cultures "are often less than eager to share a man," he writes, "typically, they would rather do that than live in poverty with the undivided attention of a ne'er-do-well." Empathy is an essential component of our ability to connect with and understand others. It allows us to experience and share the emotions of others, which in turn helps us to form strong social bonds. This capacity for empathy is believed to have evolved as a survival mechanism. In our evolutionary past, individuals who were able to empathize and form strong social bonds were more likely to receive support and assistance from others, increasing their chances of survival and reproductive success. Novak, Bridgett. 2014. Animal Research at NIH Lab Challenged by Members of Congress. Reuters U.S., Dec 24, 2014. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nih-ethics-baby-monkeys-idUSKBN0K300120141225. Accessed 16 Jan 2017.